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Abstract 
In the pursuit of developing reliable tools for electoral fraud detection, tools that use statistical 
analysis have become very popular. Specifically, methods of digits pattern analysis, of election 
results, based on observations such as ‘Benford’s law’ have been deemed especially promising 
tools in electoral fraud detection. However, some versions of this digit pattern analysis have 
received a fair share of scrutiny. This paper will focus on evaluating the use of ‘last place’ digit 
pattern analysis, a method that has been shown to be the most promising in detecting electoral 
fraud by previous literature. By application to the 2018 parliamentary election in Sweden, where 
there is no reason to suspect fraud, and to the Ugandan presidential election of 2016 where a 
fraud-free election is unlikely; we find that the last digit pattern analysis failed to distinguish 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent elections. Giving reason to question the usefulness of last 
place digit analysis. 
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Introduction 
Free and fair election is the cornerstone of a democracy. However, not all elections are 
conducted without manipulation resulting in fraudulent and unfair elections. Election 
manipulation is a prominent problem considering how you can manipulate votes at different 
levels, if one controls the bureaucracies that count the votes, they can easily be manipulated with 
little physical trace.  Additionally, in the modern day the ‘traditional’ route of fake ballots isn’t 
necessarily needed to manipulate an election. Rather “All that may be needed nowadays is access 
to an input port and a few lines of computer code” as Walter R. Mebane puts it in “Election 
Forensics: Vote Counts and Benford’s Law”(2006, p. 1). 
Some, including Mebane, have developed and applied methods to be able to detect if 
electoral fraud has occurred via mathematical analysis. One such method is based on analyzing 
the patterns of digits in vote counts and builds on observations such as ‘Benfords law’; the 
observations that certain place digits (in numerical data) have certain frequency distributions. 
Benfords law has been shown to be a promising tool for this purpose by numerous studies. The 
prospect of being able to, reliably, detect electoral fraud by simple statistical analysis using just 
the vote counts would be very useful. Not only would it cost less, since you only need to obtain 
vote counts in order to perform digit analysis. But unlike traditional methods of electoral fraud 
detection, like election commission that are often assigned by the sitting government or even 
independent observers such as the European Union's election monitors (known as the Election 
observation missions, abbreviated EUEOMs); digit-based test of electoral fraud is independent of 
human error and factors such as unobserved fraud.  
Still, the uses of digit-pattern analysis as a form of electoral fraud detection has been 
shown to not always do what it aims to. Both first- and second-digit pattern analysis have been 
shown to detect fraud where there has been non (Shikano & Mack, 2011; Deckert, Myagkov, & 
Ordeshook, 2011).  
This brings into question the usefulness of digit-pattern based tests of fraud. This paper 
will focus on evaluating the use of last digit patter analysis, specifically; a method that has been 
shown to be the most promising in detecting anomalies (Diekmann, 2007).  When using a last 
digit test to detect fraudulent vote counts, it is assumed that the last digit frequency of non-
fraudulent vote counts follows a certain (uniform) distribution. We should therefore be able to 
find such a pattern in an election where there are no real suspicions of fraud. Correspondingly, 
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we should be able to find that digit-patterns of vote counts in an election where authentic vote 
counts are unlikely deviate from the ‘expected’ distribution of non-fraudulent vote counts. The 
purpose of this paper is to tests this assumption by application on real election data.  
In the following sections Benfords law and digit analysis-based fraud detection will be 
briefly introduced, and previous research in the area will be reviewed. This will be followed by 
an attempt to evaluate the last digit test, as presented in Beber & Scacco (2012), by application 
on real-world data, namely the Swedish parliamentary election of 2018 and the Ugandan 2016 
presidential election. The former does not need a digit test to determine its validity, likewise; the 
latter does not need a digit test to determine it is fraudulent. If the last digit test does indeed 
detect electoral fraud, we should expect the results to be accordingly.  
 
 
Background 
The distribution of certain place digits 
The underlying assumption when performing a digit test is that if that digits from a 
‘naturally’ occurring data follow certain distribution while fabricated data do not follow the same 
distribution.  
Benfords Law is the observation that in sets of naturally occurring numerical data, the 
leading digits (1,2…or 9) follow a distribution that is not uniformly distributed, as one might 
intuitively expect. That is, the numbers 1 through 9 are not equally as likely to be a leading digit. 
But rather the leading digits of numerical data have a distribution where the 1 is most likely to be 
observed. This observation was first discovered by Simon Newcomb in the 19th century and 
rediscover by Frank Benford (1938). Newcomb wrote that: “That the ten digits do not occur with 
equal frequency must be evident to anyone making use of logarithm tables, and noticing how 
much faster the first pages wear out than the last ones. The first significant figure is oftener 1 
than any other digit, and the frequency diminishes up to 9.” (1881, p. 39) 
Benford had the same realisations and continued to collect set of data of varying sort and 
found that many different types of data, whether it the population of countries or the square roots 
of natural numbers, followed the frequency distribution of what was to be known as Benfords 
first digit law. Benford also developed a general digit law for the frequency distribution for the 
kth place digit (1938),  
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This ‘general digit law’ has been used obtain the expected frequencies of 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 
later place digits. Since the development of this law researchers have found that data in more 
categories follow Benford’s law. A new field of forensic statistics developed where Benfords law 
was used for detecting fraud, by researchers and professionals alike. Mark Nigrini, a prominent 
researcher within this field, used Benfords law as a tool for detecting fraud in accounting and 
auditing namely. By using Benford’s first digit law as the expected distribution in a chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit test he developed a mathematical model that would detect manipulation of the 
data.  If the data (auditing and accounting data in this case) did not follow the expected 
distribution one would assume that the data was not of natural occurrence and thus that it has 
been manipulated. Nigrini found that manipulated data not only didn’t follow Benfords law but 
deviates from it to quite an extent. With the 1st digit frequency of number 1 being close to 0% 
rather than the expected 30.1% (Nigrini, 1992). 
Benfords law has been used as a form of electoral fraud detection, in what some call 
“election forensics”(Mebane, 2006). The premise is simple: the kth place digits of non-fraudulent 
vote counts should follow a certain frequency distribution (depending on the place of digits being 
analyzed), and if the observed distribution of the digits deviates significantly from the expected 
distribution; the vote counts are likely fraudulent.  
Various studies have explored how digit analysis can be used as a tool to detect vote 
manipulation. The literature within this subject is, however, split on which place digit should be 
tested. There are three common methods in this field: first-digit analysis, second-digit analysis 
and last digit analysis. Interestingly, while the expected distribution of first place digits are 
declining in distribution (1s are more common then 9s). The expected distribution of last place 
digits is uniform in distribution assuming certain criteria are met, the mathematical explanation 
for this is given in Dlugosz & Müller-Funk (2009) and Beber & Scacco (2012).  
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 The expected distribution of first, second and last place digits are displayed in figure 1.
 
Figure 1. The distribution of 1st 2nd and last place digits  
 
Review of previous applications of digit-based tests on elections  
First digit analysis, used by, for instance, Bërdufi (2014) to detect fraud in the 2009 
Albanian election, has been criticized for its proclivity to false positives; i.e. detecting ‘electoral 
fruad’ where there has been non (Shikano & Mack, 2011; Mebane, 2007). A motivation for not 
using the first digit law when it comes to elections was given by Mebane, saying: “Imagine a 
situation where all precincts contain about 1,000 voters each, and a candidate has the support of 
roughly fifty percent of the voters in every precinct. Then most of the precinct vote totals for the 
candidate will begin with the digits ‘4’ or ’5’” (2006, p. 2). Essentially, given how first-digits of 
vote counts will inevitable be affected by factors such as vote preferences in certain 
wards/precincts, they should not be expected to follow Benfords law. 
The second digit Benford law(typically abbreviated as 2BL) has been used in plenty 
attempts at electoral fraud detection, it has been applied to the Russian election of 2007 where 
“extensive evidence of wide spread fraud” was found through 2BL testing (Mebane & Kalinin, 
Evaluating a last digit-based test for electoral fraud detection 8 
2010), and to the Iran election where fraud was also detected (Mebane, 2010). But 2BL testing 
has also received its share of scrutiny (Deckert, Myagkov, & Ordeshook, 2011; Shikano & Mack, 
2011). Where it, like first digit testing, has been criticized for giving false positives since it has 
detected fraud in elections of countries where there have been no reasonable suspicions of fraud, 
such as the German parliamentary election (Shikano & Mack, 2011). 
Furthermore, an analysis by Diekamann tested if fabricated regression coefficients can be 
detected by Benfords law and showed that anomalies are detected ‘better’ with later digits. That 
is, the rate of ‘false negatives’ (not detecting manipulation when the coefficients are indeed 
fabricated), also commonly known as type II error rate, was lower for ‘later’-digit analysis. The 
proclivity of false negatives, as well as false positives, is further elaborated on in another study 
by Diekmann, where the validity of using Benfords law to discriminate between manipulated and 
non-manipulated coefficients is discussed, it is pointed out that with an average sample size of 
100 coefficients the type II error rates are high and thus whether Benford tests are powerful tools 
in discerning between manipulated and non-manipulated data is questioned. Even here, later 
digit-tests performed better (with lower rates of false negatives/positives) (Diekmann, 2010) 
In like with Deikamanns studies, ‘later’ digit tests have also been seen a more appropriate 
choice for statistical electoral fraud analysis, last digit test being preferred by some (Beber & 
Scacco, 2012). For these reasons, this study will focus on last digit analysis of vote counts.  
The last digits of non-fraudulent vote count (i.e. vote counts that have not been 
manipulated in anyway) should follow a uniform distribution. That is, 1’s should occur in equal 
frequency to all other possible digits. See Beber & Scacco, for a more elaborate explanation.  
In previous attempts to asses a digit-analysis methods value as an indicator of electoral 
fraud some have applied it on simulation of fraudulent and non-fraudulent election like in 
Deckert, Myagkov & Ordeshook (2011). Others have applied the method on election where we 
know, with some certainty, if fraud was present or not, like in Brown & Wise (2012) and Shikano 
& Mack (2011). This paper will, similarly to the latter approach, apply digit-analysis on election 
where we know that there has or has not been fraud. But unlike Brown & Wise and Shikano & 
Mack, I will be focusing on the last digit as presented in Beber & Scacco (2012). By applying the 
test to election data where we know (with some certainty) that the vote counts have been 
tampered with or not. We can see if the test does detect vote manipulation. I will apply last digit 
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testing to the 2018 parliamentary election in Sweden, where there is no reason to suspect fraud, 
and to the Ugandan presidential election of 2016 where a fraud-free election is unlikely. 
If last digit testing is to be a considered a reliable fraud detection tool, we would expect 
the Swedish election to follow the expected distribution, while we would expect the last digits of 
the Ugandan vote counts to not follow the expected distribution of a ‘fair election’.  
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Theory 
This section intends to give a theoretical overview of two aspect of this study. Firstly the 
conditions under which the last digit of vote counts are expected to be uniform in distribution is 
outlined. Secondly an overview of the use of power analysis in the context of this study is given. 
 
Uniform distribution of last digits – in vote counts 
Unlike first and second digit tests (Mebane, 2006; Shikano & Mack, 2011), the 
assumption that that last digits of most naturally occurring data is uniform distribution is not 
directly obtained by Benfords law, given that you need a digit-place specified to obtain the 
‘Benford distribution’ according to the general digit law (Benford, 1938). However it can be 
observed that the Benford distribution of  'later placed digits'  are approximately uniform in 
distribution (Diekmann, 2007).  Additionally, Dlugosz & Müller-Funk (2009) and Beber & 
Scacco (2012) give two different mathematical proofs for the uniform distribution of last digit of 
number from continuous distribution.  
Futher, Beber & Scacco, in addition to the mathematical proofs outlined in their study, 
also showed that the theoretical result(i.e. that last digits of sets of numbers are uniform in 
distribution)holds for numbers generated from a variety of distributions: such as normal 
distribution, gamma distribution and 'mixed' distributions (see section 2.2 in Beber & Scacco, 
2012).  
Given that last digits can generally be expected to be uniform in distribution (following 
the results of Beber & Scacco and Dlugosz & Müller-Funk): non-manipulated vote counts are 
expected to follow the uniform distribution, given that two conditions are met: 
1. The vote counts do not cluster within a narrow range of numbers.  
2. The vote counts do not contain a large portion of single- or double-digit 
counts. 
Condition (1) is unlikely to pose a problem in application to the real-world vote counts as 
turnout rates and ward sizes vary enough in size (Beber & Scacco, 2012). To make sure 
condition (2) applies small candidates in the elections will be excluded in the analysis.  
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Power analysis and effect size 
The test that will be used in order to determine if the last digits of the vote counts deviate 
significantly from a uniform distribution is the Pearson chi-squared goodness of fit test. In order 
to asses if the test in underpowered for the relevant sample sizes, a power analysis will be 
performed.  
Usually the power of a chi squared test can be determined by knowing the effect size; 
“the degree to which the null hypothesis is false” (Cohen, 1988). In the case of this specific test 
the effect size would be the degree to which non-fraudulent election digits differ from the 
uniform distribution (of last digits). To calculate the effect size (ES), one needs to specify the 
alternative hypothesis, i.e. a proportion ‘𝑝1𝑗’ needs to be chosen to specify a ‘not uniform 
distribution’. The ES for a chi squared goodness of fit test is given by:  
𝐸𝑆 =  √∑
𝑝1𝑗 − 𝑝0𝑗
𝑝0𝑗
𝑛
𝑗
 
Where 𝑝0𝑗 is the proportion of digit j as theorized by the null hypothesis (i.e. 0.1 for all 
digits), 𝑝1𝑗 is the proportion of digit j as theorized by the alternative hypothesis (non-uniform 
proportions). The ES essentially give us a measure of the difference between these proportions, 
i.e. it measures the difference between the paired proportions. Intuitively, one might want to say 
that the ES should be 0, though the power of such a test (i.e. its ability to reject the null 
hypothesis when the alternative is true) would presumably be low, especially considering that the 
sample sizes are quite large. Further, the last digits of fraudulent data have only been claimed to 
be approximately uniform in distribution, not exactly uniform (Beber & Scacco, 2012). 
However, it would be of interest to see if the power is high for small effect-sizes. Cohens 
definition of a ‘small’ effect size, 0.1 will be used. The power of the test will be calculated for the 
relevant sample sizes for different effect sizes and significance levels to get an overview of the 
tests power. 
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Methodology 
As outlined in the previous sections, a last digit test the assumes that the last digits of 
vote counts follow a uniform distribution assuming that the vote returns are not single or double 
digit counts (i.e. the test can only be applied on vote counts with more than 2 digits) (Beber & 
Scacco, 2012).  
We want to test if the last digits patterns of the real-world data deviate significantly from 
the uniform, expected, distribution. If we call the vector with the observed digit distribution di 
and the expected distribution D, the testing problem is: 
• H0 : di has distribution D  
• Ha :  di does not have distribution D 
The Pearson chi-squared goodness of fit test is used to determine if the vote counts 
follow the expected distribution. The chi-square test statistic is:  
 𝜒2 = ∑
(𝑑𝑗−𝐷𝑗)
2
𝐷𝑗
9
𝑗=0 , where 𝐷𝑗  is the expected frequency of digit j, and 𝑑𝑗 is the observed 
frequency of digit j.  
The test statistic is used to determine if the vote counts deviate significantly form D at 
𝛼 = 0.05 which gives us the critical value 16.9 (given 9 degrees of freedom). If values greater 
than the critical value are obtained the null hypothesis, that the last digits of the vote counts are 
uniform in distribution, is rejected. 
Since, according to previous applications of Benfords law, deviation from the ‘expected 
distribution’ indicates fraud:  a more applicable interpretation of the null hypothesis is that the 
vote counts are non-fraudulent, i.e. have not been manipulated. The alternative hypothesis being 
that the vote counts are fraudulent.  
To obtain the digit frequencies of the two elections used in this study, you first extract the 
last number of each row in relevant columns (where the columns consist of the vote counts for 
specific candidates/parties or total vote counts, and each row is vote counts obtained at each 
ward). An example for how this can be done in R (which was used in this study) can be found in 
Beber & Scacco (2012). Then the frequency at which each digit occurs is counted. These 
frequencies are then used to calculate the proportions used to calculate the chi-squared test 
statistics.  
Evaluating a last digit-based test for electoral fraud detection 13 
In a post analysis, the proportions retrieved for each set of vote counts are used to 
simulate frequencies with larger N(simply by multiplying the vector of proportions with the 
larger N’s) in order to see how much larger N would be needed to reject the null hypothesis at 
p<0.05. This is done for sizes N up to 9000. For each ‘new’ vote count frequency a chi squared 
test is performed and the p-value is noted, these calculations are done using for loop in R.  
The Chi squared test is followed by a power analysis, which is done in order to see if the 
test is underpowered, like some of the digit-based test in Deikmann (2010) were. The power 
analysis is done using the ‘pwr’ package in R (Champely, 2018). The package contains functions 
that perform power analysis in lines with Cohen (1998), where the same definition for ES is 
used. For the purpose of this analysis pwr.chisq.test:pwr was used. The power of the tests are 
calculated for ES values between 0 and 0.2 (as small effect sizes are of interest). To calculate the 
power for different ES: the significance level, number of observations and degrees of freedom is 
specified.  
 
 Description of Data  
 
The Swedish parliamentary election of 2018 and the Ugandan presidential election of 
2016 are the real-world election data to which the last digit pattern analysis will applied. The 
Swedish parliamentary election has had no reasonable doubt against its authenticity or any 
realistic accusation of fraud, this is not the case for the Ugandan election.  
Ugandas 2016 presidential election was won by Yoweri Museveni, Ugandas ruler since 
1986. Museveni won with 61% of the votes followed by his main opponent, Kizza Besigye, who 
received 35%. The results of the election were of no surprise, Museveni was expected to win, as 
he had the last 30 years. The election is unlikely to have had a free and fair ballot. Voters and 
opposition alike doubted that Museveni could ever lose, considering he controls the electoral 
commisioners, many calling it a ‘staged election’(Abrahamsen & Bareebe, 2016). Futher, in a 
press statement following the election the US pointed out “delays in the delivery of voting 
materials, reports of pre-checked ballots and vote buying” and general “irregularities and official 
conduct that are deeply inconsistent with international standards and expectations for any 
democratic process” (US Department of State Press Statement, 2016). In summary, this election 
does not need a digit test to determine its inauntheticity. 
Evaluating a last digit-based test for electoral fraud detection 14 
The data for the Swedish election was obtianed through the The Swedish Election 
Authoritys(a government agency) website. Where in you can find election results dating back 
several years though only the most recent election was choses for this study. (2018) 
The Ugandan election data was obtaineed through Development Seed (2016) who 
complied the ballots povided by the Ugandan Election Commission. The data from Development 
Seed is used for the purpose of ease (since its in cvs format rather then pdf-files) and the 
‘orignal’ files its based on can be found on the Ugandan Election Commission website (2016). 
The data used in this analysis will be vote counts at ward levels, where all vote counts 
have more than two digits. (‘valkrets’ in the Swedish data set and ‘parish’ in the Ugandan data 
set), and so the last digit is extracted from each of the vote counts from each ward, there are a 
total of 7393 wards in the Ugandan data set and 6325 in the Swedish data set. The digit 
frequencies for both elections can be seen in table 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1 
Digit frequencies for the Swedish election 
 
S M SD total votes 
0 621 630 590 653 
1 615 641 648 607 
2 623 657 599 639 
3 616 623 645 602 
4 645 614 604 657 
5 657 625 634 611 
6 647 612 651 662 
7 660 633 621 621 
8 639 640 650 629 
9 602 650 683 644 
Note: N=6325 
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Table 2 
Digit frequencies for the Ugandan election 
 
Museveni Besigye registered 
voters 
total votes 
0 736 774 731 752 
1 712 725 726 802 
2 758 733 754 739 
3 761 714 713 709 
4 663 727 770 787 
5 764 741 770 711 
6 792 759 734 714 
7 744 740 735 715 
8 728 723 734 724 
9 735 757 726 740 
Note: N=7393 
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Results 
2018’s Swedish parliamentary election  
The chi-squared statistics for the vote counts of the Social Democrats (S), Moderate Party 
(M) and Swedish Democrats (SD) and the total vote counts (see table 3) are all beneath the 
critical value (16.9) and thus the vote counts do not deviate significantly from the expected 
uniform distribution. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that the vote counts of the 
election are non-fraudulent, according to the last digit test. (see figure 2 and table 3) 
 
Table 3 
Test statistics for the Swedish election 
 
Chi-squared statistic p-value N 
S 5.528 0.786 6325 
M 3.084 0.961 6325 
SD 11.811 0.224 6325 
total votes 6.723 0.666 6325 
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Figure 2. digit frequencies for the Swedish election 
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2016’s Ugandan presidential election 
The chi-squared statistics for the vote counts of the Museveni, Besigye and the registered 
voters and the total vote counts (see table 4) are all beneath the critical value (16.9) and thus the 
vote counts do not deviate significantly from the expected uniform distribution. In other words, it 
is reasonable to assume that the vote counts of the Ugandan election are non-fraudulent, 
according to the last digit test. (see figure 3 and table 4) 
 
Table 4 
Test statistics for the Ugandan election 
 
Chi-squared statistic p-value N 
Museveni 14.817 0.096 7393 
Besigye 4.342 0.887 7393 
registered voters 4.450 0.879 7393 
total votes 12.920 0.166 7393 
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Figure 3. digit frequencies for the Ugandan election 
 
 
Further, it is worth noting that the proportion of the vote counts in the Swedish election is indeed 
closer to an exact uniform distribution than the vote counts of Museveni (see table 3 and 4), 
where the Museveni vote counts would have been considered significantly non uniform in 
distribution at p<0.1. Additionally; through simulating last-digit frequencies with the same 
proportion as the Museveni vote counts but with larger number of observations (in order to see 
how much larger N would be needed to reject the null hypothesis as p<0.05). We see, through 
the p-values of the chi square tests performed on the simulated data (illustrated in figure 4) that 
the null hypothesis would be rejected at number of observations more than N=8441; which 
corresponds to an increase of 1048 observations.  
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Figure 4. P-values of chi-squared goodness of fit tests with different N, with observed 
proportions based on Museveni vote counts.  
 
A similar simulation was done for the rest of the Ugandan vote counts for which the null 
hypothesis was not rejected for N less than 9000. Similarly, for the proportions of last digits of 
the Swedish parties the null hypotheses the null hypothesis would not be rejected even when the 
number of observations is increased to 9000 (an increase by 2675). It goes without saying, 
however, that if N was increased more the null hypothesis would be rejected for all last digit 
frequencies eventually, given that even very small differences would be detected eventually as 
𝑁 →  ∞ . This was however not the point of the simulation, rather it shows that a relatively small 
increase in N for the Museveni data results in a rejection of the null hypothesis at p<0.05; i.e. the 
assumption that the null hypothesis is non fraudulent would no longer hold. We could therefore 
say that the Museveni-data, while being the only vote counts reasonable suspected of fraud, is 
also the only set of vote counts with last digits frequencies relatively close to being significantly 
different from uniform in distribution.  
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Power analysis  
The results from the power analysis (illustrated in figure 5 and 6), show that at least for 
sizes N like that used in this study, the test can discriminate between small differences in 
distribution with high power(1); given the arbitrary definition of a ‘small’ effect size, 0.1 (Cohen, 
1988). Further, the power of the test is higher than 0.8 for effect sizes above 0.05 even at a 0.01 
significance level.  
 
Figure 5. Power for chi-squared test at different effect-sizes and significance levels (with 
N=6325) 
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Figure 6. Power for chi-squared test at different effect-sizes and significance levels (with 
N=7393) 
 
To be able to say that the test is a powerful test in discriminating between fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent vote count we would have to assume that non-fraudulent data does not differ with 
less than 0.05 effect size from the expected uniform distribution. Because if differences in 
distribution smaller then 0.05 (in effect size) are to be deemed fraudulent, the test would have a 
type II error rate higher then 0.2: i.e. it would not detect fraud, when fraud has occurred more 
than 20% of the time.  
Still, if differences smaller than 0.1 in effect size are to be deemed negligible, the test 
could by no means be considered underpowered for the relevant sample sizes (the power being 1 
in both cases). 
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Conclusion 
If the last digit frequency of non-fraudulent, authentic vote counts is uniform in 
distribution, as claimed in Beber & Scacco (2012), then the Swedish and Ugandan election are 
free of fraud according to the last digit-pattern analysis. Since both last digits frequencies of both 
elections do not deviate significantly from uniform distribution, we can reliably assert that both 
elections have last digit frequencies of uniform distribution, at a significance level of 0.05, The 
problem here is apparent: while the test can be expected to reliably distinguish between uniform 
and non-uniform distributions; the last digit analysis failed to indicate fraud where electoral 
fraud likely occurred.  
Further, given the results of power analysis, the test seems to not be underpowered when 
it comes to distinguishing between uniform and non-uniform distributions for the sample sizes in 
this study; rather it has a high power when distinguishing ‘small’ differences. The definition of a 
‘small’ effect size is, however, not a given in every case; and it ought to be decided on a case-to-
case bases, usually by knowing how a given theoretical phenomena’s expected distribution 
differs in the ‘real world’ (Cohen, 1998). What size difference between an exact uniform 
distribution of digits and real-world (non-fraudulent) vote count distributions should be deemed 
negligible is hard to answer without basing it on measuring the real discrepancy between the last 
digit vote counts proportions of a large sample of known non-fraudulent vote counts and an exact 
uniform distribution, and thus specifying an alternative hypotheses to calculate the appropriate 
effect size. However, given the lack of access to a more suitable definition of ‘small’ effect size 
for the scope of this paper, Cohen’s definition is relied on, and thus the tests are not considered 
underpowered.  
The results of the digit pattern analysis for the Swedish election is as expected, since 
other obviously non-fraudulent elections have been shown to have uniformly distributed last 
digit frequencies (Beber & Scacco, 2012). But if this last digit analysis is to be trusted, the 
Ugandan vote counts should be deemed authentic, however unlikely that is, and thus we should 
ignore valid suspicions of vote manipulation as reported by numerous sources (Abrahamsen & 
Bareebe, 2016). This raises the question: if an election obviously riddled with vote tampering 
and irregular conduct is ‘non-fraudulent’ according to the last digit analysis, then is the test 
useful? While the small scope of this paper cannot give a definite answer to this, it at the very 
least calls for the need to further asses the value of this test. Further, it could perhaps even be the 
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case that the vote counts are indeed authentic, despite the accusations of vote manipulation. One 
could argue, however, that a case like Uganda, where suppression of opposition prior to elections 
is common (Abrahamsen & Bareebe, 2016), the authenticity of vote counts still does not indicate 
a  ‘fair’ elections. This is the most obvious limitation of the digit analysis; it only indicates direct 
vote manipulation.  
It is worth considering however, that if the chi-squared goodness of for test was to be 
done at a 0.1 significance level, the null hypothesis would have been rejected for Museveni vote 
counts and they would have been deemed fraudulent. Additionally, the Museveni vote counts 
would have been rejected at 𝛼 = 0.05 if the number of observations where increased (by 1048). 
So, one could say that the Ugandan vote counts deviate ‘more’ from the expected last-digit 
distribution. This could however just be by chance, and the last digit test (as initially constructed 
with 𝛼 = 0.05) could be correct in deeming the Ugandan vote count non-fraudulent.  This bring 
into question however, what significance level is appropriate for this type of test. Do we want to 
increase the likelihood of type I error? Or should we, if anything, have a higher (say, 0.01) 
significance level? Surely, detecting fraud where there has been none is undesirable, but so is the 
reverse; if the test is to be useful.  
A problem with my analysis is that only one election of, most likely, fraudulent vote 
counts is used. A study of larger scope would be preferable, an obvious issue being the 
unavailability of obviously fraudulent election data. Perhaps then simulations of fraudulent vote, 
like in Deckert, Myagkov, & Ordeshook (2011) and Mebane (2006), would be a better approach. 
Although, both studies had vastly different approaches in what they deem constitutes ‘fraudulent 
vote counts’ simulations. Which begs the question: what does fraudulent vote counts look like? 
Or rather, what is the appropriate way of simulating them? Ideally, you could approach this 
question by looking at the distribution of the last digits of several fraudulent elections, this of 
course assumes such data could be available.  
To finish, confirming that of previous studies, last digits of non-fraudulent vote counts 
seem uniform in distribution. Yet from the results of my analysis, it does not seem obvious that 
fraudulent vote counts do not also follow this uniform distribution. Of course, further exploration 
is needed in order to make any conclusive statements about the distribution of fraudulent vote 
counts. This would be an interesting approach for further research.  
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